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Abstract: 
Using a panel of linked employer-employee data from Portugal, we follow the 
performance of firms and workers during the first decade of 2000s in terms of the risk 
of firm shutdown and of chances of workers’ entering unemployment. This allows us 
to identify the characteristics of unsuccessful firms and workers over this period and, 
of most interest, whether these characteristics changed as a consequence of the global 
crisis. In addition, and different from previous works, we (i) assess whether there is a 
differential effect to crisis depending on firm size, and (ii) relate the workers’ risk of 
unemployment to the hazard of firm shutdown. In the analyses of hazard of shutdown 
and risk of unemployment most of the effects of observed covariates remained 
unchanged through the business cycle. There is a differential response to crisis 
depending on firm size. A small firm’s risk of shutdown is 9 times the risk of a large 
firm. However, the chances of becoming unemployed are less than twice larger for a 
worker in a small firm. This suggests that large firms may be less likely to shutdown, 
but they are not a shield from unemployment. 
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1. Introduction  
The Portuguese labour market conditions in the first decade of the 2000s can be 
summarised by splitting the decade into two sub periods. In the first half of the 
decade, Portugal is reported by the OECD as a country with high rates of labour force 
participation and low unemployment rates. This strong labour market performance 
was typically explained by some flexibility in real wage adjustment and the expansion 
of atypical contracts, such as temporary and/or fixed term employment contracts. The 
policy challenge was to raise income levels of the population and increase 
competitiveness through improving the productivity of the labour force via policies 
aimed at enhancing human capital and labour mobility. Low-skilled sectors were 
facing higher levels of competition from new EU members, suggesting that the 
Portuguese economy needed to shift its production towards more high-skilled/higher-
value-added sectors. Investments in education and in the acquisition of skills, 
according to the OECD, would make the labour force more adaptable, foster the use 
of new technologies and develop the high-skill sectors of the economy. 
In the second half of the decade the OECD reported concerns about rising 
unemployment and the need to prevent cyclical unemployment from becoming 
structural (OECD, 2010). More attention was drawn to restrictive employment 
legislation which acted as a barrier to labour mobility. Low levels of job mobility 
gave incentives to firms to use fixed-term contracts which reduced incentives to 
provide training (OECD, 2006). The strategy to improve labour market conditions 
was to impose less restrictive employment legislation in order to facilitate labour 
mobility, the creation of jobs, and the integration of job seekers back to work. The 
expectations were for this to shorten unemployment spells and encourage firms to 
offer permanent contracts and provide training opportunities for their employees.  
 
The changes in the labour market conditions and adjustments in the focus of policy 
challenges suggested by the OECD are likely to be related to the changes in the 
international economic conditions. Labour markets become more volatile during 
periods of unanticipated exogenous shocks such as the world-wide financial crisis of 
2008-2010.  In a period of global economic crisis, disturbances in aggregate demand 
drive firms to adjust their production structure and/or their investment decisions, and 
cause some to shutdown; while some workers are made redundant and lose their jobs. 
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Furthermore, the recent financial crisis made access to credit from banks more 
difficult and imposed financial constraints on firms and individuals. It is documented 
that credit restraints lowers particularly the growth and investment of small businesses 
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke et al., 1996), the predominant firm size in 
Portugal. It is also argued that there is a differential response of firms, in terms of firm 
growth and survival, depending on their access to capital and that smaller firms are 
more sensitive to monetary shocks than larger firms (Berger and Udell, 2002; Gertler 
and Gilchrist, 1994).  
 
The rather unique labour market circumstances, the impact of the financial crisis and 
its potential differential effect on the  growth and survival of firms depending on their 
size, prompt our interest in the Portuguese case and motivate us to split our analyses 
in two periods: before and during the economic crisis. Our aim is to identify not only 
the determinants of some labour market phenomena, but also whether the effects vary 
with the business cycle. In particular, in this paper we identify changes to the 
Portuguese labour market over the period 2002–2009, in terms of both the survival of 
firms and of workers’ probabilities of becoming unemployed. We describe the 
characteristics of the Portuguese labour market between 2002 and 2009 and address a 
number of research questions. What determines the risk of firm shutdown? Were there 
differences in the dynamics of firm destruction before and during the global economic 
crisis? Which workers were more likely to become unemployed? Furthermore, since 
84% of Portuguese firms employ less than 10 workers (micro firms) and given the 
potential for a differential effect of financial constraints on firm performance, we 
disaggregate some of our results by firm size. 
 
Our results confirm that firm- and industry-specific variables as well as macroeconomic 
conditions are significant determinants of the risk of firm shutdown. The average risk of a 
firm shutting down is larger in the period of crisis, and the effect of some covariates 
changes with the business cycle. There is also a differentiated risk of firm’s closing 
depending on firm size. Micro and small firms not only have a larger risk of failure when  
compared to other firm sizes, but also the chances of failure of smaller firms rises more 
during economic downturns. This supports the hypothesis that large firms face 
economic downturns by adjusting their structure of production and employment 
levels, while small firms are more prone to leave the market.  
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A comparison of the impacts of worker characteristics on the probability of entering 
unemployment pre-crisis and during the crisis suggests that generally there is little 
change, and that the crisis did not affect which workers became more or less likely to 
become unemployed or the relative sizes of these effects. The stability of the effects 
of observed covariates, associated to the smaller effect of the unobserved match-
quality and of the intrinsic risk of firm shutdown suggest that sectoral shocks are 
relatively more important a determinant of unemployment during economic 
downturns. The analyses of the probability of unemployment by firm size also support 
this hypothesis, as it more than doubled between 2002 and 2009 for all firm sizes. 
This suggests that despite being less likely to shutdown, larger firms do not shield the 
worker from unemployment. 
 
In the following Section we describe the data used, the Quadros de Pessoal from 
Portugal. In Section 3 we present our empirical strategy, which focus on the 
determinants of the hazard of firm shutdown and on the determinants of worker’s 
probability of unemployment. Estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Data 
The data used in this analysis are the Quadros de Pessoal (QP) from Portugal, a 
longitudinal data set with matched information on workers and firms. These data have 
been collected annually since 1985 by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment and 
the participation of firms with registered employees is compulsory. The data include 
all firms (over 250 thousand per year) and employees (more than two million per 
year) within the Portuguese private sector. Our focus is on patterns of firm closure 
and worker mobility before and during the recession, and so we use data collected 
from 2002 to 2009.2 Each firm and each worker has a unique registration number 
which allows them to be traced over time. All information – on both firms and 
workers – is reported by the firm. We restrict our analysis to manufacturing and 
services, and the resulting sample is composed of 537,896 unique firms (who 
                                                 
2QP data were not collected in 2001, hence our analysis starts in 2002 rather than 2000. 2009 is the 
most recent year for which the data set has been built.  
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contribute 2,400,388 firm-year observations) and 4,526,413 workers (mounting to 
20,603,105 worker-year observations) over the period. 3 
 
In Table 1 we provide a brief description of the data by year, and report the number of 
employed workers, the number of firms, the number of new firms, the number of 
firms that shut down, firm death rates and the unemployment rate. It is possible from 
the raw data to see the effects of the 2008 global crisis. With respect to employment 
levels (column i), after consecutive years of systematic net job creation, over 100 
thousand jobs were lost between 2008 and 2009 (from nearly 2.8 million to 2.7 
million employed workers in 2009). The yearly stock of firms (column ii) follows a 
similar pattern: the number of private sector firms grew from 2002 (269,943 firms) to 
2008 (323,524 firms), while in 2009 there was a net destruction of firms (to 317,155) 
– about six thousand firms fewer than in 2008. The number of firms created per year 
(column iii) grew continuously over the period from 2002 until 2008 and nearly 
25,000 firms were created in 2008. However, in 2009 only 20,976 new firms were 
created, similar to the number in 2005 (when 20,819 firms were created). Firm 
destruction (column iv) is identified as the year in which firms were last observed in 
the data, and we assume that firms die within the 12 subsequent months (that is, 
between t and t+1). Until 2006 less than 31,000 firms died yearly. The number of 
firm closures rose to 37,000 in the period 2007-2008 and to 45,000 between 2008 and 
2009. The rates of firm shutdown (computed as the number of deaths between t and 
t+1 over the number of firms in year t) ranged from 9% in the first half of the decade 
to 14% by the end of it (column v). These patterns of creation and destruction of jobs 
and firms are reflected in the official unemployment rate (column vi) which rose 2 
percentage points between 2008 and 2009, when it exceeded 9%.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
In Table 2 we summarise the distributions of firms and employment by firm size. The 
Portuguese economy is dominated by small and medium sized firms (column i), 84% 
of firms have less than 10 employees (micro firms) and almost 14% are small firms 
(with 10 to 49 employees). That is, 98% of Portuguese firms employ less 50 workers 
                                                 
3We do not consider the primary sector (agriculture, fishing, extraction) owing to most firms being 
family businesses and coverage of this sector in the QP data set thus being low.  
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overall. Medium (50 to 249 employees) and large (250+ employees) firms correspond 
to 2% of the total number of firms in the country, but they account for nearly 45% of 
total employment.4 The 98% of micro and small firms account for the remaining 55% 
of total employment (column ii). Most of the dynamics of firm creation and 
destruction (columns iii and iv) happens amongst small and micro firms: 99% of firms 
created and destroyed are either small or micro firms. Larger firms are less likely to 
be destroyed than smaller firms.  
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
  
In Table 3 we present the rates of firm destruction by year and firm size. For all firm 
size categories, death rates of firms are relatively stable up until 2006, and then 
increase sharply in the years of the global crisis. For example, death rates of micro 
firms increased by 4 percentage points between 2006 (11%) and 2009 (15%), while 
those of small and medium sized firms increased by 3 percentage points in the same 
period (from 4% to 7% and from 3% to 6%, respectively). Death rates of large firms 
remained fairly stable over the period.  These stylized facts are consistent with the 
argument that large firms may be more likely to reflect the shocks of the economy on 
sales performance, while for smaller firms shocks and policy changes are more likely 
to be reflected in rates of survival, destruction or creation (Berger and Udell, 2002; 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). 
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
  
Our strategy is to identify the sample of firms in 2002 (and those who have entered 
the panel since) and follow their performance over subsequent years in terms of 
survival and the probability of shutting down. This allows us to identify the 
characteristics of unsuccessful firms in this period and, of most interest, whether these 
characteristics changed with the global financial crisis. That is, we investigate 
whether firms that died during the recession are different from those dying previously. 
For that purpose we start by estimating the models with the full sample period (2002-
2009), and then allow the estimated coefficients to vary before and during the crisis. 
                                                 
4This classification of categories of firm size (micro, small, medium, large) follows the European 
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC. 
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We also select the sample of workers who worked in firms over this period and follow 
them over time, so we are able relate the success of the worker with the success of the 
firm. In particular, we examine the impact of the risk of firm shutdown on the 
probability that the worker separates becomes unemployed for a year or more. 
 
3. Estimation  
We conduct two sets of analysis. First, we analyse the determinants of the risk of firm 
shutdown by estimating duration models of the probability of firm shutdown in t+1 
conditional on survival up to time t. In doing so, we control for the characteristics of 
the firms, of the economic environment, and of the firm’s workforce. Secondly, we 
identify the characteristics of workers who were more likely to be exposed to the 
crisis in terms of the risk of leaving the current firm (between t and t+1). 
 
3.1 Hazard of firm shutdown 
We estimate the hazard of firm shutdown between two consecutive years (t and t+1) 
using a discrete time multivariate proportional hazards approach. In particular we 
apply a complementary log-log model with firm-specific random effects (Jenkins, 
2004).5 The nature of our data implies that we have an inflow sample with left 
truncation and right censoring (that is, we include in our sample all firms existing in 
2002 plus firms that were created between 2002 and 2009, and we observe only a 
proportion of them shutting down over the period). Because information on the year 
the firm was created is available in our data, we are able to model the time 
dependence of the risk of shut down. In other words we can model the correlation 
between the probability of firm shutdown and the age of the firm. We do this using a 
non-parametric baseline hazard rate identified by duration-interval-specific dummy 
variables. We allow the baseline hazard rate to vary yearly up to the 10th year of 
survival of the firm. We then assume the baseline hazard to be constant during the 
second and third decades of firm survival (one baseline hazard for each decade), and 
then assume the hazard to be the same for all ages after the third decade of firm 
survival. We therefore have thirteen interval-specific baseline hazard rates. 
 
                                                 
5
 We use this discrete time representation of a continuous time proportional hazards model because our 
data are interval censored. That is, we know the firm leaves the panel between t and t+1 but we do not 
know the exact date when this event occurs. 
7 
 
The hazard rate (h(t)) is conditional on a range of firm-level covariates (x) as well as 
firm survival (t), such that 
 x); t T|  t= Pr(T = h(t) jj ≥ .   Eq. 1 
Assume that firm j shuts down between t and t+1 with probability Pr(yjt=1)= λ j and 
that it survives with probability Pr(yjt=0)=1– λ j. Assume further that this probability 
is a function of covariates (x) and of an unobserved firm-specific effect (ψ j), such 
that the hazard rate can be expressed by the following 
jk22110jt ...= ψββββλ +++++ kjtjtjt xxx . Eq. 2 
Although our underlying continuous time model is summarized by the hazard rate 
(h(t)), our data is interval-censored. Therefore, we estimate the parameters describing 
the hazard rate taking into account the discrete nature of the duration data using a 
complementary log-log specification 
jk22110jt ...= )]1log(log[ ψββββλ +++++−− kjtjtjt xxx . Eq. 3   
This implies 
β
λ
jtxe
jt e
−
−= 1ˆ
.   Eq. 4 
Where λ jt is the estimated hazard rate of firm shutdown conditional on the 
characteristics of the firm, and of the economic environment (x); on survival up to 
time t; and on the firm-specific random effect ψ j. We assume the latter follows a 
normal distribution and is independent from both time and the other explanatory 
variables.  
 
Specific characteristics of the firm and of its product market are likely to affect the 
risk of a firm exiting the market (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Mata et al, 1995; 
Holmes et al, 2010). To account for these effects we include in our vector of 
covariates (x) a number of variables. These include firm size (micro, small, medium, 
large), as previous evidence suggests that the risk of failure is expected to be larger 
for smaller firms (Berger and Udell, 2002; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994). We also 
include a measure of firm growth, defined as the percentage change in employment 
from period t to t+1, to control for adjustment processes in firm size. The ownership 
structure of the firm should also have an effect on the hazard rate of shutdown. We 
control for ownership status – that is, whether the firm is private-, public- or foreign-
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owned. These ownership categories are distinguished by whether the financial capital 
necessary to constitute the firm is at least 50% owned by private-nationals, public 
entities, or private-foreign entities, respectively. We expect foreign-owned firms to be 
geographically more mobile and have higher rates of exit from the Portuguese market 
than national firms. We also control for whether a firm is multi-establishment. Multi-
plant firms are expected to have lower rates of shutdown than single establishment 
firms. The rationale behind this is that multi-plant firms are more likely to have 
accumulated more knowledge about the economic environment and may also have a 
more experienced management structure, thus reducing their chances of failure. 
Controls for the industry of the firm (17 sectors) and industry growth (measured as the 
percentage change in employment from t to t+1) are also included. The growth rate of 
the industry may be a signal of market growth; we expected it to be negatively related 
to the risk of shutdown. We also control for whether, within an industry, the firm is 
high wage or low wage. A firm is defined as high wage if the average wage within the 
firm is in the top quartile of the distribution of average wages of all firms within the 
industry. It is defined as low wage if the average wage is in the bottom quartile of the 
average wage distribution of all firms in the industry. Our expectation is that firms 
with higher wages are more likely to invest in training and in the provision of firm-
specific human capital, therefore are less likely to exit the market. A set of covariates 
constructed by aggregating the characteristics of workers employed at the firm is also 
included. Our hypothesis is that a more stable and skilled workforce reduces the risk 
of firm closure since such a workforce is possibly more productive and more likely to 
have accumulated firm/industry specific human capital. The covariates  included are 
the proportion of workers in the firm that have an upper secondary or university 
education, the proportions of workers that are high- and medium-skilled6, and the 
proportion of workers with open-ended contracts of employment in the firm (as 
opposed to temporary employment contracts). Macroeconomic conditions also affect 
the survival rates of firms. To control for aggregate shocks we include both year and 
region indicators (there are six standard regions in Portugal). As discussed previously, 
time dependence is captured by variables indicating the firm’s age.7  
                                                 
6
 Firms are requested to classify workers into nine skill levels according to the complexity and 
responsibility of the tasks performed; we group these into three categories: high, medium and low 
skilled workers. 
7
 Summary statistics of variables over the samples analysed (the three sub-periods) are presented in 
Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
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3.2 Workers’ probability of unemployment 
In the job separation models the dependent variable its  equals one if the worker will 
become unemployed between t and t+1, and zero otherwise. Here we define entering 
unemployment as the worker separating from the current firm and not being observed 
in the data for more than one year (or exits the data permanently).8 The model is 
specified as: 
itijitxs it εγβ ++=*    Eq. 5 
where *
it
s denotes the unobservable propensity for the worker to separate between t 
and t+1; itx  is a vector of observed individual, firm and job-related characteristics; ijγ  
captures the unobserved time-invariant quality of the match between the worker and 
the firm; and itε is random error.
9
 We treat ijγ as random and estimate this using a 
random effects probit model under the common assumption that ( )2,0~ εσε INit  and 
are orthogonal to the covariates.  
 
Two explanations are commonly used for the mobility of workers between firms and 
sectors: sectoral demand shifts, and worker-firm mismatch. The demand shifts 
approach argues that intersectoral job mobility arises as a response to shifts in demand 
for labour caused by shocks in product preferences and technology in different 
industries of the economy (Lucas and Prescott, 1974; Lillien 1982; Abraham and 
Katz, 1986). These shifts lead to changes in the relative marginal products of labour in 
different activities which, in turn, call for a reallocation of labour. The process of 
reallocating workers across industries involves unemployment, which should be 
frictional. In matching models, separations are a consequence of optimal reassignment 
caused by the accumulation of better information about the quality of the worker-firm 
match as time elapses. If the worker-firm pairing is a mismatch, a separation is likely 
                                                 
8
 The data is a panel of private sector firms and the workers employed in such firms. Workers who 
disappear from the sample may be either in unemployment, in economic inactivity, or working in the 
public sector. As transitions from private to public sector employment are infrequent in Portugal 
(DGAEP, 2005), and economic inactivity rates (for reasons other than being in education or retirement) 
are low and declining over the 2000s (INE/Pordata, 2011), we interpret exits from the data as 
unemployment. 
9
 Since we use linked employer-employee data we could choose the unobserved effects to be worker-, 
firm- or match-specific. Our choice leans towards match-specific random effects to account for the 
possibility of match quality influencing job mobility. In doing so, we are implicitly also controlling for 
unobserved time invariant worker and firm-specific effects. 
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to happen. But, in good matches, investment in firm-specific human capital will be 
greater and the match will be less likely to end (Jovanovic, 1979a, 1979b, 1984). As 
firms pay (at least) part of the training costs, they are particularly concerned about the 
turnover of employees with firm-specific human capital and, recognizing that quits 
depend on wages, they may offer these workers a higher wage that could not be easily 
matched by competing firms (Bernhardt and Scoones, 1993).  
 
Stylized findings suggest that most mobility happens within sectors and that flows of 
workers between sectors tend to cancel out (Jovanovic and Moffitt, 1990). These 
findings suggest that the dynamics behind separations from firms depend on sectoral 
shocks, worker and firm’s decisions, and the quality of the worker-firm match. To 
account for the various sources of labour mobility, in our models we include a range 
of worker characteristics such as the log monthly real earnings, gender, education 
(ISCED – 4 levels) and skill levels (high, medium-, low-skilled), seniority at the firm 
and potential labour market experience, and type of employment contract (permanent 
vs. temporary).10 Employer characteristics include firm size (micro, small, medium, 
large) and growth (change in employment between t and t+1), firm ownership 
(private, public, foreign), whether the firm is multi-establishment, and whether the 
firm’s average wage is high/low compared to the average of wages paid within an 
industry. Controls for location (6 regions) industry of the firm (17 sectors), and 
industry growth (measured as the percentage change in employment from t to t+1) are 
also included. Year dummies capture any aggregate macroeconomic effects, such as 
fluctuations in product demand induced by the global economic crisis. The quality of 
the match is controlled for by the inclusion of the match-specific random effect. We 
also include in the worker-separation model the estimated hazard of firm shutdown. A 
positive relationship indicates that workers in firms that have higher hazards of shut 
down have a higher probability of becoming unemployed for a year or more. Our 
hypothesis is that if this effect is constant (or declines) across the business, then we 
may have a signal that the risk of unemployment in times of global macroeconomic 
                                                 
10
 ISCED stands for International Standard Classification of Education (as defined by UNESCO). In 
Portugal we can identify 4 levels:  1 – up to primary education; 2 – lower secondary education; 3 – 
upper secondary education; and 4/6 – post secondary and tertiary education. 
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disturbances is more related to sectoral shocks affecting the economy as a whole, than 
it is to the idiosyncratic risk of firm shutdown.11  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Estimates of hazards of firm-shutdown  
Estimates from the discrete-time representation of the continuous time proportional 
hazards model of firm shutdown are presented in Table 4. The reported coefficients 
are hazard ratios. They summarise the proportional effect on the hazard rate of a one 
unit change in the covariates (a coefficient above/below one implies a proportionally 
larger/smaller hazard). For the sake of clarity and brevity we omit some coefficients 
(industry, region, and aggregate characteristics of the firm’s workforce) and report 
only those of most interest.  
 
In column (i) we present estimates from the model where the whole period under 
analysis is considered. We then estimate models with the same specification but 
referring to the two sub-periods relating to 2002-2005 (column ii) and 2006-2009 
(column iii). We do this to identify any changes in the impacts of the covariates on the 
hazard rate of firm shutdown before and during the global crisis. 
 
Our estimates confirm the hypothesis that firm size matters – all coefficients on the 
firm size indicators are positive relative to micro-firms and highly statistically 
significant. This indicates that the hazard rate of shutdown is inversely related to size 
with micro and small firms being more likely to close down than larger firms. Column 
(i) shows that over the period as a whole small firms are 68% (1-0.32) less likely to 
shutdown than micro-firms while large firms are 82% (1-0.18) less likely. The effects 
of firm size became less pronounced in 2006-09 (shown in Column ii) relative to 
2002-05 (column iii), that is all coefficients became closer to one – the baseline. 
Hence firm size was less important in explaining firm shutdowns during the financial 
crisis than in the preceding period, although it remained an important factor.  
We include the growth of the firm (percentage change in employment) between t and 
t+1 to control for some adjustment process in firm size. The coefficient on this 
                                                 
11
 Summary statistics of variables over the samples analysed (the three sub-periods) are presented in 
Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
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variable is statistically significant. Reducing employment by 10 percentage points 
increases the hazard of firm shutdown by 0.5%. 
 
Our estimates indicate that foreign and public owned firms have shutdown rates 
different from those of privately owned firms. On average public firms have a lower 
hazard rate of shutdown (0.62) while foreign owned firms have a 13% higher hazard 
of shutdown than privately owned firms (column i). However this effect only emerges 
in the pre-recession period and the effect of ownership is statistically insignificant 
during the crisis years (column iii). Hence during the financial crisis public and 
foreign owned firms were as likely to shutdown as private firms. Being a multi-
establishment firm, however, reduces the hazard of shutdown by 40% relative to 
single-establishment firms and this effect persisted through the crisis. Such multi-
establishment firms may use their experience and accumulated knowledge about the 
economic environment to appropriately respond to the recession.  
 
The growth rate of the industry, used as a proxy for market growth, is important in 
determining shutdowns, but only during the recession. The effect is not statistically 
significant in the period preceding the crisis (column ii), but becomes statistically 
significant during the global crisis: increasing employment in the industry by one 
percentage point reduces the hazard of shutdown by 1.2%.  
 
The relative wage of the firm is an important determinant of the hazard rate of 
shutdown. High wage firms are less likely to shutdown than average wage firms, 
while low wage firms are more likely to shutdown. Furthermore these effects are 
more pronounced in times of economic crisis. For example, before the crisis (column 
ii) being a high wage firm within an industry was associated with a hazard rate of 
shutdown that was 19% below that of an average wage firm, while during the crisis it 
was associated with a 26% lower hazard rate of shutdown. In contrast, low wage firms 
were 23% more likely to shutdown than average wage firms pre-crisis, and 29% more 
likely during the crisis. Firms paying higher wages may be more likely to invest in 
training and in developing firm-specific human capital, which reduces their chances 
of exiting the market. Not rejecting this hypothesis, may imply that investing in 
workforce skills and firm-specific human capital is a potential means of surviving 
negative economic shocks.  
13 
 
 
The year dummies reflect aggregate macroeconomic effects, and the estimated 
impacts of the global financial crisis on the hazard of shutdown are quite strong. The 
2007 indicator relates to the period 2007-2008 when the financial crisis first hit the 
USA, and the 2008 indicator relates to 2008-2009.  Controlling for other covariates, 
for duration dependence and for time-invariant unobserved firm-specific effects, the 
hazard of firm shutdown in 2007-08 was almost three times larger than in 2002 (a 
hazard ratio of 2.8), while that in 2008-09 was almost four times larger (hazard ratio 
of 3.8). Therefore even when holding other factors constant, our estimates confirm the 
sharp rise in the year-on-year rates of firm shutdowns obtained from the raw data 
presented in our descriptive statistics. 12  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The pattern of duration dependence estimated for each sample is presented in Figure 
1. On average, the estimated the hazard of firm shutdown rises up to the fourth year of 
age of the firm (positive duration dependence) and declines as the firm ages (negative 
duration dependence), as expected. Since the estimated hazards are computed from 
three different samples and refer to the relative risk with respect to the baseline 
(constant of the model), the lines in the figure are not directly comparable. The 
average risk of a firm shutting down for the period 2002-2009 is 0.03; and  for period 
2006-2009 is 0.05 (see Table 4). During recession, the hazard of shut down in the 
second year of age is 23% larger than the baseline; while the hazard of shutting down 
in the second year of age during the period 2002-2009 is 21% larger than that of the 
first year. Therefore, in times of crisis both the baseline risk of shutdown and the risk 
of dying in the first couple of years of firm survival are larger. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As an exercise to further highlight the relative impact of the crisis on firm survival, 
we have computed predicted probabilities of firm shutdowns based on the estimates 
                                                 
12
 We have controlled for firm unobserved effects in our models. For all three periods, the firm random 
effects are important, and account for more than 60% of the variance (rho). The formal tests, for each 
model, comparing the pooled estimator with this panel estimator (not shown here) reject the hypothesis 
that the panel-level variance (rho) is zero. 
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for the period as a whole (column i). These predicted hazards are displayed in Table 
5. Our estimates reinforce the observations from the raw data (Table 3) and support 
the argument on the differential effect of credit constraints by firm size. Micro firms 
have the highest hazard of closing down, and this risk increases sharply in the years of 
crisis (from 0.05 in 2002-03 to 0.17 in 2008-09). The rates of firm shutdown are 
negatively related to firm size. The rates of shutdown of larger firms are not only 
smaller, but they also rise less sharply over the period of analysis. This is particularly 
so for large firms, which have a predicted hazard of shutdown of 0.005 in 2002-03 
and of 0.02 in 2008-09.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Therefore, we conclude that firm- and industry-specific variables are significant 
determinants of the risk of firm shutdown, and that macroeconomic conditions are 
important too. The effect of some covariates depends on the business cycle, though most 
of them are statistically significant determinants pre- and during-crisis. There is a 
differentiated risk of firm’s closing depending on firm size, micro and small firms not 
only have a larger risk of failure, but also this risk is more sensitive to the business cycle 
as it rises more in times of crisis. 
 
4.2 Probability of workers separating from firms  
We next discuss the estimates of the probability of the worker separating from a firm 
and becoming unemployed – that is, the probability of a worker leaving a firm and 
taking more than one year to reappear in the dataset or not reappearing in the data at 
all. The analysis is again divided into three periods: 2002-2009, 2002-2005 and 2006-
2009, and the estimates are presented on Table 6. The reported coefficients are 
average marginal effects obtained from the random effects probit model as specified 
in Equation 5.13  
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Our estimates indicate that the probability of becoming unemployed falls with the 
wage received. A one log-point increase in the wages of workers reduces their 
probability of unemployment by about five percentage points over the period as a 
                                                 
13
 The average marginal effects are interpreted as proportionate effects on the probability of 
becoming unemployed of a marginal increase (or a unit increase) in the explanatory variable.   
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whole. If wages reflect the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and the value 
of the marginal product of workers, then high wage workers are more valuable to the 
firm in terms of skill, and hence are less likely to be dismissed. This hypothesis is 
supported by the estimated effects of skill level on the probability of becoming 
unemployed; less skilled workers have a higher probability of becoming unemployed. 
In the period 2002-2009 the probability of a low-skilled worker becoming 
unemployed was 2.2 percentage points higher than that of a high skilled worker. 
Women are less likely than men to become unemployed, and this emerges for both the 
overall period (2002-2009) and the early 2000s.14 Differences between men and 
women in the probability of entering unemployment became smaller in the period of 
the global crisis (women were only 0.8 percentage points less likely to enter 
unemployment than men).  
 
More educated workers are more likely to become unemployed (ISCED5/6 are 3.6p.p. 
more likely to experience unemployment than ISCED1 workers). This result may 
appear surprising, but is possibly explained by results obtained in Ferreira (2009). The 
author concludes that more educated workers have a higher risk of making transitions 
out of a firm, but they are also more likely to find a new job within a shorter period of 
time than less educated workers.15 As expected, workers on temporary employment 
contracts are, on average, seven percentage points more likely to experience 
unemployment than workers with more permanent employment relationships.  
A comparison of the impacts of worker characteristics on the probability of entering 
unemployment pre-crisis and during the crisis suggests that generally there is little 
change.  This suggests that the crisis did not affect which workers became more or 
less likely to become unemployed or the relative sizes of these effects. 
 
The characteristics of firms are also important in explaining the probability of a 
worker becoming unemployed. The smaller the firm, the more likely a worker is to 
enter unemployment. On average over the period, working in a large firm reduces the 
chance of becoming unemployed by 3.4 percentage points relative to working in a 
micro-firm. Firm ownership also affects the probability of unemployment. Over the 
                                                 
14
 A similar result was obtained with Portuguese data by Ferreira (2009). 
15
 Could be voluntary unemployment while looking for better job, but larger effect during crisis 
suggests not. 
. 
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period 2002-2009, workers employed by either public or foreign-owned firms are one 
percentage point more likely to become unemployed than workers employed by 
private home-owned firms. The effect of ownership status, though, changes during the 
business cycle. During the financial crisis of 2006-2009, workers employed by public 
firms were one percentage point less likely to become unemployed than those in 
private firms, while workers in foreign-owned firms were still one percentage point 
more likely.  
 
We can associate product market growth (industry change in employment from t to 
t+1) to unemployment, and it is inversely related to the chances of unemployment. 
Comparing the two time periods, between 2002-05 industry growth increased the 
chance of entering unemployment by 0.1 percentage points, while between 2006-09 
industry growth reduced the chances of entering unemployment by 0.2 percentage 
points. This may reflect patterns of voluntary unemployment. During periods of 
economic growth and industry growth, workers are more willing to quit and look for 
better job, while during recession, workers in industries that are growing stay in their 
jobs rather than quit. 
 
 The relative average wages paid by the firm in which a worker is employed are also 
statistically significant determinants of entering unemployment, and the effect is 
stronger in the lower tail than in the upper tail of the industry’s average wages 
distribution. Working in firms that pay wages in the bottom quartile of the industry-
specific wage distribution is associated with a two percentage point higher probability 
of becoming unemployed, while working in a firm that pays wages in the top quartile 
of the industry’s wage distribution is associated with a 0.5 percentage point lower 
probability of becoming unemployed. Furthermore the effects of firms’ relative wages 
are stronger in times of crisis. Workers in high wage firms became relatively less 
likely to enter unemployment in 2006-09 relative to 2002-05 (0.4 percentage points 
compared with 0.2 percentage points), while those in low wage firms became 
relatively more likely to enter unemployment (2.1 percentage points compared with 
1.6 percentage points).  
 
The estimated coefficients on the year indicators show that aggregate macroeconomic 
conditions strongly affect the chances of unemployment even when controlling for 
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individual and firm level characteristics, and they became more important in the 
period of the global economic crisis. The chances of becoming unemployed in 2008-
2009 were eight percentage points higher than those of becoming unemployed in 
2002-2003. The increased risk of unemployment caused by aggregate shocks also 
emerges during the crisis. The risk of becoming unemployed in 2008-2009 is seven 
percentage points higher than that of becoming unemployed in 2006-2007.  
 
Overall, during 2002-2009, a one percent increase in the hazard rate of firm shutdown 
increases the chances of unemployment by 14 percentage points. This suggests that, in 
the case of a firm closing down, workers are likely to take more than a year to find a 
new job. The effect of the risk of firm shutdown on the probability of entering 
unemployment is higher in the pre-crisis period than during the crisis itself. It 
increases the risk of entering unemployment by 29 percentage points between 2002 
and 2005, and by 9 percentage points between 2006 and 2009.  We therefore conclude 
that, in times of crisis, the chances of unemployment become less related to the 
dynamics of the firm itself, and more associated to the general downturn in the 
economic environment that affects all firms across the economy overall. 16  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
We illustrate the relative sizes of the estimated effects by computing predicted 
probabilities of a worker entering unemployment by firm size and year. These are 
displayed in Table 7. The smaller the firm the higher the predicted probability of a 
worker becoming unemployed. However,   the evolution of the predicted probabilities 
of entering unemployment differs less by firm’s size than the probability of firm 
shutdown (shown in Table 5). The probability of becoming unemployed is negatively 
related to firm size, but the probability of becoming unemployed more than doubled 
between 2002 and 2009 for all firm sizes. This suggests that although larger firms are 
less likely to shutdown, they do not shield the worker from unemployment. 
 
                                                 
16
 We included worker-firm random effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity in match quality. 
The estimate of rho gives the proportion of the total variance contributed by the unobserved match 
quality. Our estimate of rho is statistically different from zero and indicates that unobserved match 
effects are responsible for over 54% of variance in the error term, and so we conclude that worker-firm 
match quality is an important component affecting workers’ mobility. 
. 
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5. Conclusions 
The global economy was hit by a financial crisis and a subsequent recession from 
2007 onwards. This crisis severely limited the access to credit for both firms and 
workers. The financial crisis constrained the ability of firms to invest and expand, and 
the ability of workers to borrow and consume goods and services both directly 
through lower income growth and indirectly through, for example, job loss prompted 
by firm failure.   
In this paper we use micro data to identify resulting changes in the Portuguese labour 
market, both in terms of the survival of firms and in terms of job mobility. In terms of 
the likelihood of firm shutdown, in particular, our results suggest that firm-specific, 
industry-specific and macroeconomic variables are all important determinants of the 
hazard of a firm closing down. We estimated models separately for the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods and we conclude that the effects of the covariates were, in general, 
intensified by the downturn in the business cycle rather than being changed by it. 
Therefore, we conclude that it is likely that aggregate demand shocks were more 
important than market-specific shocks in determining the risk of firm shutdown 
during the global crisis. We have also attempted to verify the hypothesis that smaller 
firms are more sensitive to monetary shocks than larger firms, hence having a 
different response of firms, in terms of firm survival. And conclude that, conditional 
on the effects of the covariates, the estimated risk of shutdown is inversely related to 
firm size and is larger for smaller firms than for large firms. Although both rates of 
death rise during the global crisis, the risk of a large firm shutting down remains fairly 
low (2%) while that of a small firm reaches 17%. 
The failure of firms is expected to have an impact on the mobility of workers, and 
may become a potential source of problem in terms of unemployment. The financial 
crisis may have increased the risk of cyclical unemployment becoming structural 
unemployment (such a risk had already started to be pointed out by the OECD on the 
second half of the decade). We conclude for the importance of worker- and firm-
specific covariates in determining the risk of unemployment, and the effects of these 
covariates are in line with those obtained in previous research: women, low skilled 
and temporary workers have higher chances of becoming unemployed. The risk of 
unemployment is also larger for workers in small, private sector, and low-wage firms. 
We attempted to identify changes between the risk of a worker becoming unemployed 
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for a year or more with the inherent risk of a firm shutting down. Our results suggest 
that during time of crisis the effect of the hazard of firm shutdown is less pronounced 
than it is in the pre-crisis period, thus suggesting that sectoral shocks are relatively 
more important a determinant during economic downturns. The analyses of the 
probability of unemployment by firm size also support this hypothesis. Although the 
probability of becoming unemployed is negatively related to firm size, it more than 
doubled between 2002 and 2009 for all firm sizes. This suggests that despite being 
less likely to shutdown, larger firms do not shield the worker from unemployment. 
And is a further signal that large firms react to economic downturns by adjusting their 
structure of production and employment levels, while small firms are more prone to 
leave the market.  
 
The years that will follow are of most importance in shaping the future of the 
Portuguese economy. Analyses of the structure of firms created after this crisis and 
the assessment of whether these firms are being created in higher value-added sectors 
will shed light on whether the economy is making the transition claimed by OECD. If 
so, then the Portuguese economy is likely to be within a process of creative 
destruction with the global crisis resulting in the death of more fragile and less 
competitive firms and in the survival and birth of more productive “good” ones. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1 Distribution of firms and workers by year, 2002-2009 
Year Employment 
No. of    
Firms 
Firm 
Creation 
Firm 
Destruction 
% of 
deaths 
Unemp. 
Rate 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)  (v) (vi) 
2002 2,319,279 269,943 17,292 25,986 9.63 4.5 
2003 2,366,768 277,190 29,747 25,668 9.26 6.1 
2004 2,422,340 282,847 18,489 26,389 9.33 6.3 
2005 2,620,413 303,791 20,819 30,420 10.01 7.2 
2006 2,652,511 307,793 21,941 31,092 10.10 7.3 
2007 2,737,951 318,145 24,351 36,546 11.49 7.9 
2008 2,793,915 323,524 24,844 44,640 13.80 7.3 
2009 2,689,928 317,155 20,976 -- -- 9.1 
Notes: Unemployment rates as of the 2nd quarters of each year, source: INE. All 
other statistics are the authors’ own calculations based on Quadros de Pessoal 2002-
2009. 
 
 
Table 2 Distribution of firms and employment by firm size, average 2002-2009 
 % Distribution of 
Firms Employment 
Firm 
Creation 
Firm 
Destruction 
Firm Size (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Micro 83.66 27.21 94.31 93.23 
Small 13.91 27.35 5.24 6.03 
Medium 2.13 21.28 0.41 0.67 
Large 0.30 24.20 0.05 0.07 
Total 2,400,388 20,603,105 168,459 220,741 
 
 
Table 3 Death rates by year and firm size (%) 
Year Micro Small Medium Large Total 
2002-2003 10.85 4.16 2.46 2.22 9.63 
2003-2004 10.43 3.68 2.93 1.92 9.26 
2004-2005 10.50 3.65 2.61 1.84 9.33 
2005-2006 11.21 4.03 2.78 2.40 10.01 
2006-2007 11.28 4.10 2.74 3.37 10.10 
2007-2008 12.76 5.11 3.59 2.77 11.49 
2008-2009 15.15 6.93 5.56 2.23 13.80 
Total 11.83 4.55 3.33 2.41 10.60 
Note: death rates are computed as the number of firms in year t that will die 
in year t+1 (rates computed using number of firms in year t as baseline) 
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Table 4 Hazard estimates of firm shutdown for the periods 2002-09, 2002-05 and 2006-09 
 
 
2002-2009 
(i) 
2002-2005 
(ii) 
2006-2009 
(iii) 
Firm size (baseline: micro)   
    Small 0.316*** 0.288*** 0.341*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
    Medium 0.224*** 0.209*** 0.272*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) 
    Large 0.184*** 0.180*** 0.218*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.031) 
Firm growth (t, t+1) 0.994*** 0.992** 0.995* 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Ownership status (baseline: private)   
    Public 0.622*** 0.507*** 0.802 
 (0.72) (0.086) (0.013) 
    Foreign 1.126** 1.233*** 1.051 
 (0.041) (0.063) (0.053) 
Multi-establishment 0.600*** 0.586*** 0.607*** 
 (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
Industry growth (t, t+1) 0.997** 1.003 0.988*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wages (baseline: average wage, industry  Q2-Q3)   
High wage firm 0.777*** 0.809*** 0.736*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) 
Low wage firm 1.225*** 1.233*** 1.290*** 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Year (baseline:  (i) 2002; (ii) 2002; (iii) 2006)   
    2003 1.242*** 1.318***  
 (0.013) (0.018)  
    2004 1.565*** 1.716***  
 (0.021) (0.037)  
    2005 1.818*** 2.100***  
 (0.024) (0.047)  
    2006 2.164***   
 (0.032)   
    2007 2.769***  1.658*** 
 (0.044)  (0.032) 
    2008 3.759***  2.515*** 
 (0.070)  (0.081) 
constant 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.045*** 
 (0.038) (0.059) (0.065) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Region effects Yes Yes Yes 
rho 0.609 0.653 0.656 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) 
Log Likelihood -672,528 -343,896 -330,302 
No. of observations 2,083,182 1,133,771 949,411 
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Notes: Discrete hazard model of firm shutdown with firm random effects. Hazard ratios reported, 
std errors in parenthesis (* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001). Coefficients on aggregate 
characteristics of the firm’s workforce, mentioned in Section 3, were included in the 
specifications but are omitted from the Table. 
 
 
Figure 1 Patterns of duration dependence over the 3 periods of analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Predicted hazards of firm shutdown between t and t+1, 2002-2009 
Year Micro Small Medium Large Overall 
2002-2003 0.047 0.013 0.008 0.005 0.041 
2003-2004 0.058 0.017 0.010 0.006 0.051 
2004-2005 0.069 0.020 0.011 0.008 0.061 
2005-2006 0.084 0.024 0.014 0.009 0.074 
2006-2007 0.096 0.027 0.016 0.011 0.084 
2007-2008 0.122 0.036 0.021 0.014 0.108 
2008-2009 0.167 0.050 0.029 0.019 0.148 
Note: mean of predicted hazards by year and firm size obtained from 
estimates of the hazard model as of Table 6, column (i) 
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Table 6 Estimates of probabilities of workers becoming unemployed for the period 2002-2009, 
and sub-periods 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 
 
2002-2009 
(i) 
2002-2005 
(ii) 
2006-2009 
(iii) 
Log(monthly real wage) -0.060 *** -0.052 *** -0.045 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Women -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.008 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Education (baseline: ISCED 1)    
     ISCED 2 0.012 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
     ISCED 3 0.011 *** 0.007 *** 0.013 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
     ISCED 5/6 0.036 *** 0.036 *** 0.031 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Skill level (baseline: high-skilled)    
     Medium-skilled 0.006 *** 0.002 *** 0.004 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
     Low-skilled 0.022 *** 0.016 *** 0.017 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Temporary contract 0.071 *** 0.068 *** 0.064 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Firm size (baseline: micro firms)    
     Small firm -0.012 *** -0.007 *** -0.007 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
     Medium firm -0.027 *** -0.020 *** -0.016 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
     Large firm -0.034 *** -0.020 *** -0.025 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Ownership status (baseline: private)    
     Public 0.009 *** 0.022 *** -0.010 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
     Foreign 0.011 *** 0.005 *** 0.011 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
Industry growth (t, t+1) 
-0.000 *** 0.001 *** -0.002 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Average wage of firm vs. Average industry wages 
 
     High wage firm 
-0.005 *** -0.002 *** -0.004 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
     Low wage firm 0.023 *** 0.016 *** 0.021 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Year (baseline 2002 in (i) and (ii); 2006 in (iii)) 
    2003 0.034 *** 0.039 ***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   
    2004 0.047 *** 0.055 ***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   
    2005 0.035 *** 0.052 ***  
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 (0.000)  (0.000)   
    2006 0.031 ***   
 (0.000)    
    2007 0.045 ***  0.032 *** 
 (0.000)   (0.000)  
    2008 0.081 ***  0.065 *** 
 (0.001)   (0.001)  
Hazard 2002-2009 0.142 *** 0.293 *** 0.094 *** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)
rho                     0.543 0.672 0.629                     
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  
No. of observations 16,006,410 8,643,791 7,362,619 
mean pun(pu0) 0.114 0.081 0.074  
 [0.086] [0.076] [0.091]  
Note: Random effects probit models of probability of becoming unemployed controlling for match 
(worker-firm) unobserved effects. Standard errors in parenthesis: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; *p<0.05. 
Standard deviations in squared brackets. Further controls include: age, tenure, firm growth (t, t+1), 
multi-plant firm, industry, and region. 
 
 
 
Table 7 Predicted probabilities of unemployment between t and t+1, 2002-2009 
Year Micro Small Medium Large Overall 
2002-2003 0.099 0.074 0.059 0.051 0.070 
2003-2004 0.139 0.104 0.083 0.078 0.100 
2004-2005 0.152 0.115 0.092 0.087 0.111 
2005-2006 0.146 0.109 0.086 0.085 0.106 
2006-2007 0.143 0.106 0.083 0.082 0.103 
2007-2008 0.169 0.126 0.099 0.099 0.122 
2008-2009 0.238 0.176 0.141 0.139 0.172 
Note: mean of predicted probabilities of becoming unemployed, by year and 
firm size, obtained from estimates of the random effects probit model model 
as of Table 6, column(i) 
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1 Summary statistics of firm-level data: sample means of variables for the 3 periods analysed 
Variable 2002-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 
Rate of death of firms 0.106 0.096 0.118 
Industry growth (t, t+1) (%) 1.911 2.695 0.974 
Firm growth (t, t+1) (%) 2.266 3.338 0.986 
Prop. High educ (%) 28.454 25.001 32.578 
Prop. High skilled (%) 33.369 32.541 34.358 
Prop. Medium skilled (%) 37.602 39.350 35.514 
Prop. Stable contracts (%) 58.123 58.587 57.570 
High wage firm 0.221 0.221 0.220 
Low wage firm 0.202 0.202 0.202 
Firm size (baseline: micro firms, <10 workers)  
Small firm (10 – 49 workers) 0.140 0.144 0.136 
Medium firm (50- 249 workers) 0.021 0.021 0.021 
Large firm (250+ workers) 0.003 0.003 0.003 
Ownership status (baseline: private)    
Public 0.001 0.001 0.002 
Foreign 0.011 0.010 0.011 
Multi-establishment 0.059 0.058 0.061 
Industry  (baseline: food, beverages & tobacco)  
Textiles, clothing, leather 0.035 0.038 0.031 
Wood, cork, paper 0.024 0.026 0.022 
Non-metallic products 0.016 0.017 0.015 
Metal products 0.037 0.040 0.034 
Furniture & other manufacture 0.016 0.017 0.016 
Electricity, gas, water 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Construction 0.152 0.156 0.148 
Wholesale & retail trade 0.309 0.313 0.305 
Hotels & restaurants 0.116 0.116 0.117 
Transport, storage, communications 0.044 0.044 0.045 
Post & telecommunications 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Financial intermediation 0.008 0.007 0.009 
Real estate 0.113 0.105 0.122 
Education 0.013 0.012 0.014 
Health & social work 0.042 0.040 0.045 
Other services 0.053 0.049 0.058 
Region (baseline: North coast)   
Center Coast 0.164 0.165 0.162 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.332 0.333 0.330 
Inland 0.125 0.126 0.124 
Algarve 0.056 0.055 0.058 
Islands 0.037 0.037 0.037 
Age of firm (years, baseline 1 year old firms) 
2 0.069 0.074 0.062 
3 0.065 0.073 0.056 
4  0.062 0.071 0.051 
5 0.059 0.063 0.053 
6 0.056 0.051 0.061 
7 0.053 0.046 0.060 
8 0.047 0.042 0.053 
9 0.040 0.039 0.042 
10 0.037 0.036 0.038 
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11-20 0.177 0.140 0.221 
21-30 0.176 0.192 0.157 
30+ 0.110 0.122 0.095 
Year    
2003 0.133 0.244  
2004 0.136 0.249  
2005 0.146 0.268  
2006 0.148   
2007 0.153  0.335 
2008 0.155  0.341 
No. of observations 2,083,182 1,133,771 949,411 
 
 
 
Table A.2 Summary statistics of worker-level data: sample means of variables for the 3 periods 
analysed 
Variable 2002-2009 2002-2005 2006-2009 
Unemployment 0.139 0.143 0.134 
Log(monthly) wages 6.552 6.550 6.555 
Tenure 7.522 7.550 7.488 
Experience 20.797 20.655 20.963 
Hazard of firm shutdown  0.035 0.024 0.047 
Women 0.442 0.435 0.450 
Education (baseline: ISCED1)   
ISCED2 0.211 0.197 0.227 
ISCED3 0.204 0.188 0.222 
ISCED56 0.112 0.097 0.129 
Skill (baseline:high-skill)   
Medium Skill 0.413 0.427 0.396 
Low-skill 0.371 0.365 0.377 
Type of contract (baseline: open-end)  
Closed-end 0.225 0.206 0.247 
Other 0.046 0.052 0.039 
Firm wages    
High wage firm 0.488 0.497 0.477 
Low wage firm 0.114 0.108 0.121 
Firm size (baseline: micro firms, <10 workers)  
Small firm (10 – 49 workers) 0.282 0.284 0.279 
Medium firm (50 – 249 workers) 0.228 0.228 0.228 
Large firm (250+ workers) 0.260 0.258 0.263 
Multiestablishment  0.357 0.351 0.364 
Ownership status (baseline: private)   
Public 0.035 0.036 0.034 
Foreign 0.101 0.097 0.105 
Industry  (baseline: food, beverages & tobacco)  
Textiles, clothing, leather 0.083 0.092 0.073 
Wood, cork, paper 0.030 0.032 0.027 
Non-metallic products 0.039 0.041 0.035 
Metal products 0.072 0.078 0.066 
Furniture & other manufacture 0.017 0.018 0.017 
Electricity, gas, water 0.006 0.006 0.005 
Construction 0.125 0.126 0.124 
Wholesale & retail trade 0.204 0.203 0.205 
Hotels & restaurants 0.067 0.065 0.069 
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Transport, storage, communications 0.046 0.046 0.046 
Post & telecommunications 0.014 0.015 0.012 
Financial intermediation 0.033 0.033 0.033 
Real estate 0.112 0.103 0.123 
Education 0.021 0.019 0.024 
Health & social work 0.058 0.051 0.065 
Other services 0.036 0.034 0.039 
Region (baseline: North coast)   
Center Coast 0.143 0.146 0.139 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 0.414 0.412 0.415 
Inland 0.082 0.082 0.083 
Algarve 0.035 0.033 0.036 
Islands 0.039 0.039 0.039 
Year (baseline: 2002)    
2003 0.131 0.243  
2004 0.135 0.251  
2005 0.147 0.272  
2006 0.149   
2007 0.154  0.334 
2008 0.157  0.342 
No. of observations 16,006,410 8,643,791 7,362,619 
 
 
